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ownership, maintenance or use of an unin-
sured auto." Under this provision of 
McKoy's policy, Aetna limits its dollar 
liability to a single injured person 
(McKoy) at $20,000. 
Third, Part lII(d) , the set-off clause 
upon which Aetna relied, also modifies 
the primary liability of Part I by indicating 
that "any amount payable to the insured 
under the terms of [the policy] shall be 
reduced" by the amount of sums paid to 
the insured "on behalf of the tortfeasor." 
See Id., at 30, 374 A.2d at 1172. 
There was no dispute that Part III (d) 
meant that the $10,000 from the D.C. 
driver's insurance already paid to Mrs. 
McKoy should act as a set-off. The issue 
became one of determining the proper 
referent of the phrase "any amount paya-
ble." If this meant the total amount corre-
sponding to the total damages, $29,000, 
suffered by Mrs. McKoy, then the 
$10,000 set-off would leave Aetna with a 
$19,000 obligation. On the other hand, if 
those words in III (d) referred to the 
amount payable from Aetna to McKoy, 
$20,000, then the application of the set-
off would leave Aetna with a mere 
$10,000 obligation. 
In holding for Mrs. McKoy, the court 
stated that both lII(a) and III (d) were inde-
pendent modifiers of the total amounts 
payable clause in Part I. Thus, the set-off 
did not reduce the Aetna limit of liabilit~, 
but the total sums to which that liability 
was to be applied, i.e., the outstanding 
amount payable to plaintiff McKoy after 
the application of the $10,000 paid on 
behalf of the tortfeasor. 
In order to remove any doubt about the 
correctness of the result, the court stated: 
Even assuming that the interpretation 
of the policy urged upon us by Aetna is 
an equally reasonable one, this would, 
at best, create an ambiguity. In such 
Situations, ambiguities are resolved 
against the author of the instru-
ment. Penn., Etc., Ins. Co. v. 
Shirer, 224 Md. 530, 537, 168 A.2d 
525,528 (1961). 
281 Md. at 31,374 A.2d at 1173. 
The decision of the court rested en-
tirely upon the construction of the Unin-
sured Motorists Endorsement issued by 
Aetna. To avoid this result in future cases 
involving the Uninsured Motorists 
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coverage, Aetna could restructure the 
language of its endorsement specifically 
to limit the coverage. While it is evident 
that the court intended that an insured 
benefit from as much of her insurance as 
possible, it could have reached a more en-
during result based upon substantive law 
rather than contract construction had it 
dealt with the alternative argument that 
the set-off clause was void under MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A §541. This section requires 
that insurers issuing policies for Maryland 
drivers provide a minimum of $20,000 
U!M coverage for each policy, and a court 
could construe the Code to require ap-
plication of the $20,000 obligation to the 
balance of "any amount payable" to an 
insured after application of a set-off. The 
court chose not to reach this question, 
and thus left this case vulnerable to isola-
tion on its facts. See id., at 28 n.l, 374 
A.2d 1171 n.l. 
McKoy articulates well the problem of 
uninsured motorists insurance protec-
tion--a problem acute in Maryland, which 
entertains more than its share of foreign 
drivers who are without sufficient 
coverage of their own. It also appears that 
the result in this case works a two-edged 
economic sword, with one blade cutting 
costs to an insurance consumer like 
McKoy by holding an insurance company 
to its full obligation in the manner pro-
vided by this court. The other edge, 
however, narrows company profit margin 
resulting in higher insurance rates. 
Terry 
Examined 
by James F. Kuhn 
The Court of Special Appeals has ren-
dered invalid an investigatory stop based 
solely on information received in a police 
radio broadcast absent other indications 
of present danger and criminal activity. 
Price v. State, 37 Md. App., 248, 376 
A.2d 1158 (1977). 
On April 5, 1975, a Prince George's 
County police officer on routine patrol 
received a radio broadcast that an armed 
robbery suspect, James Price, was 
believed to be driving a silver 1966 
Cadillac and that he was in possession of a 
shotgun, stolen goods, and narcotics. The 
officer, having sighted an automobile 
matching the description given in the 
broadcast down to the tag number, ap-
proached the driver when he stepped from 
the car in a gas station and conducted a 
patdown of the driver who at that time 
identified himself as James Price. This 
limited search, conducted on the basis of 
the radio alert alone, produced a knife 
from the person of the appellant. He was 
arrested on a weapons charge and subse-
quently convicted on separate charges, 
relating to a robbery which had occured 
three weeks earlier on the basis of evi-
dence seized by a second officer while 
searching the car in the gas station. 
Price's contention on appeal was that the 
state had failed to establish the necessary 
"reasonable suspicion" to justify his being 
stopped and frisked for weapons, thus vio-
lating rights guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Nine years ago, the Supreme Court 
made clear in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
(1968), that police officers may "in ap-
propriate circumstances and in an ap-
propriate manner approach a person for 
purposes of investigating possibly crimi-
nal behaviour even though there is no 
probable cause for making an arrest" and 
that where the officer "observes unusual 
conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot and that 
the persons with whom he is dealing may 
be armed and presently dangerous" he 
may conduct a limited frisk for weapons 
by patting down the outer clothing of the 
suspect. 392 U.S. at 22. Terry requires 
only that the officer be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts that would 
justify a reasonable suspicion that the in-
dividual is armed and presents a threat to 
the officer or bystanders. 
In Price, the state argued that the pat-
down was justified under the Terry 
doctrine in that a police broadcast that a 
suspect is armed and dangerous in and of 
itself justifies a patdown for weapons even 
if it does not constitute probable cause for 
arrest. The danger of too broad a reading 
of the Terry doc trine lies in its abuse in 
cases where the state may seek to dignify 
an otherwise invalid investigatory pro-
cedure. The narrow holding in Terry was 
originally intended as justification for 
good faith searches, limited in scope to a 
pat down for weapons in a situation rea-
sonably perceived by the officer as pre-
senting immediate danger. The gist of 
Terry is good-faith preemption of hostile 
citizen reaction to a lawful police stop; 
Terry was not envisioned as applying an 
excuse for bad faith or sloppy police work 
and the "stop and frisk" perceived by the 
Supreme Court was clearly not meant to 
be a habitual law enforcement procedure. 
In Price, the court noted that the officer 
had concededly acted solely on the basis 
of the police broadcast and that he ob-
served nothing in the course of his ap-
proaching the defendant which indicated 
that he might be armed. The court dis-
tinguished Williams v. State, 19 Md.App. 
204, 310 A.2d 593 (1973), where it 
upheld a "stop and frisk"based on a simi-
lar radio alert together with other circum-
stances which were found sufficient to 
give rise to the required reasonable suspi-
cion. Specifically, in Williams, the fact 
that the automobile was parked in the 
same general vicinity only ninety minutes 
after a shooting incident was a specific 
and articulable fact which reasonably war-
ranted the self-protective frisk, whereas in 
Price the court was faced with the ques-
tion whether the police broadcast alone 
would give rise to this suspicion where the 
offense which was the subject of the 
broadcast had occured three weeks earlier 
and in another part of the county. The 
unaccompanied police broadcast was held 
insufficient. 
The rationale underlying Terry goes to 
the legitimate interest of the state in pro-
tecting its law enforcement officers from 
the inherent dangers involved in the con-
ducting of investigations of those 
suspected of possible criminal activities. 
The cases following Terry have been 
forced to apply a balancing test between 
the rights of individuals to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures and 
society's interest in protecting its police 
from potential threatened violence when 
such is the case. The difficult question to 
which the court addressed itself in this 
case is whether the frisk can be upheld at 
a suppression hearing where the arresting 
officer has no reason other than the 
broadcast for conducting the frisk and 
where the prosecution is unable to iden-
tify the source of the information bringing 
about the alert. Through a delicate bal-
ancing of the interests outlined in Terry, 
the court has chosen not to expand its 
prior holding in Williams to encompass a 
situation such as that in Price. 
While it might legitimately be sug-
gested that Price almost completely 
deprives police officers of the right to con-
duct protective frisks solely on the basis 
of police radio broadcasts alerting officers 
of armed and dangerous suspects (who are 
identified with certainty), officers in fear 
of their safety may conduct such frisks if 
they can point to any specific and ar-
ticulable facts supporting the broadcast 
(such as in Williams) which reasonably 
leads them to conclude that criminal ac-
tivity is afoot and that the subject of their 
investigation is armed. Furthermore, such 
a frisk based on the broadcast alone will 
be upheld if the facts underlying the radio 
alert are established by the state at the 
suppression hearing. Price, while declin-
ing to extend the former rule, reaffirms 
the self-protective frisk under appropriate 
circumstances and at the same time 
preserves the right of the people to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The narrow holding of Price requires only 
that evidence seized as the result of an ar-
rest made following a productive frisk for 
weapons based solely on the radio broad-
cast must be suppressed both where the 
accuracy underlying the broadcast cannot 
be documented and in the absence of 
other indicia of present danger. 





by John Jeffrey Ross 
To obtain a conviction of a defendant 
accused of grand larceny in the District of 
Columbia, the Government must present 
evidence that the property stolen was 
worth at least $100.00. (See 22 D.C. 
Code Sec. 2201). Such evidence should 
include proof of the fair market value of 
the item. This axiom appears to be too 
simple to require judicial explanation, but 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
recently reversed a felony grand larceny 
conviction because of the Government's 
failure to establish the threshold value. 
Williams v. United States, 376 A.2d 442 
(D.C. App. 1977). 
John Williams was convicted of grand 
larceny after the Government convinced 
the jury that he had taken a television set 
(and other effects of negligible value). The 
evidence showed that Mr. Williams sold 
the television for $50.00 and then bought 
it back for $100.00 in the hope of return-
ing it to avoid prosecution. There was 
further testimony by the complaining wit-
ness of the property's original purchase 
value and state of repair. 
Williams subsequently appealed this 
conviction, claiming that the Govern-
ment's evidence was insufficient to dem-
onstrate a felony theft. In remanding the 
case for a misdemeanor disposition the 
Court of Appeals stated that the failure of 
the Government's case was the reliance 
on the evidence of only "a) physical pres-
ence of the items stolen and b) the 
owner's statement of original cost." 376 
A.2d at 443. The Court indicated that the 
"fair market value" is defined as that 
"price at which a willing seller and a will-
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